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Abstract
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched
to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general
feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though multiple doctors can be matched
to a single hospital, a hospital has a responsive preference and a maximum quota. However,
in practical applications, a hospital has some complicated cardinal preference and constraints.
With such preferences (e.g., submodular) and constraints (e.g., knapsack or matroid intersec-
tion), stable matchings may fail to exist. This paper first determines the complexity of checking
and computing stable matchings based on preference class and constraint class. Second, we
establish a framework to analyze this problem on packing problems and the framework enables
us to access the wealth of online packing algorithms so that we construct approximately stable
algorithms as a variant of generalized deferred acceptance algorithm. We further provide some
inapproximability results.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a two-sided, one-to-many matching model when one side (a hospital or firm)
is allocated members from the other side (a doctor or worker), covering constraints to satisfy
practical or social demands and prohibiting infeasible allocation (matching). The theory of two-
sided matching has been extensively developed, as illustrated by the comprehensive surveys [29, 25].
Matching with constraints has been prominent across computer science and economics since
the seminal work by [19]. In many applications, various constraints are often imposed on an
outcome, e.g., type-specific quotas on hospitals to assign several different types (skills) of doctors [1],
budget constraints on hospitals to limit the total amount of wages [2, 20, 21]. The current paper
exactly covers these complicated constraints and further generalizes them. Specifically, we consider
general constraints of upper bounds known as independence system constraints, i.e., any subset
of a feasible set of doctors is also feasible. We assume that each constraint is represented by a
capacity (maximum quota), an intersection of multiple matroids, or a multi-dimensional knapsack.
It should be noted that every independence system constraint can be represented by an intersection
of multiple matroids and a multi-dimensional knapsack. In addition, we assume that each hospital’s
preference is represented by a utility function. We consider three important classes of cardinal
utilities: cardinality, additive, and submodular.
With such preferences and constraints, stable matchings may fail to exist. Determining whether
a given instance has a stable matching is hard in general. It is known to be ΣP2 -complete when
hospitals’ utilities are additive, and the constraints are given as (1-dimensional) knapsack [15].
Note that the existence of stable matchings is guaranteed when the utilities are additive and the
constraints are matroid [22] or the utilities are cardinality (matched size) and the constraints are
knapsack [20].
There are several possibilities to circumvent the nonexistence problem. One modifies the notion
of the stability and proposes a variant of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm [14, 19, 2].
Another restricts hospitals’ priorities to ensure the existence of a stable matching, e.g., lexicographic
priorities [8]. Alternatively, Kawase and Iwasaki [20] and Nguyen et al. [27] focused on near-feasible
stable matchings that approximately satisfy each budget of the hospitals.
This paper focuses on approximately stable matchings where the participants are only willing
to change the assignments for a multiplicative improvement of a certain amount [3]. This idea can
be interpreted as one in which a hospital in a blocking pair changes its match as soon as its utility
after the change increases by any (arbitrarily small) amount. Arkin et al. [3] examined a stable
roommate problem, which is a non-bipartite one-to-one matching problem, while we examine a
bipartite one-to-many matching problem. It is reasonable for a hospital to change its assignments
only in favor of a significant improvement; even though the grass may be greener on the other side,
crossing the fence takes effort.
Our results First, we analyze the problem of checking the stability on (offline) packing problems
so that we understand the features and obtain the complexity results, which vary according to
hospitals’ utilities and imposed constraints. In particular, Theorem 1 proves that given a matching,
checking whether it is stable or not is equivalent to solving a packing problem. Once we know the
complexity of a packing problem in a given setting (utilities and constraints), we obtain that of the
checking problem associated with the setting. Our results are summarized in Table 1 (a).
Second, Table 1 (b) summarizes our trichotomy results characterizing the complexity of deter-
mining whether a given instance has a stable matching or not. The problem is polynomially solvable
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in very restricted classes of utilities and constraints, while it is NP-complete or ΣP2 -complete in the
other settings. Here, ΣP2 (also known as NP
NP) is the class of problems solvable in polynomial
time by a nondeterministic Turing machine with an oracle for some NP-complete problem. To
prove the NP-hardness, we give a reduction from DisjointMatching, which is NP-complete [11].
In addition, we prove the ΣP2 -hardness by reductions from the ∃∀3DM or ∃∀SubsetSum, which are
ΣP2 -complete [5, 26].
Finally, we introduce a framework that leads us to construct algorithms that find approximately
stable matchings as a variant of generalized deferred acceptance (GDA). Intuitively, each hospital
utilizes an online packing algorithm while running a GDA procedure. By applying the property
called α-approximation [21], we show that if there exists an α-competitive algorithm for a class
of online packing problems, then we can construct a DA algorithm that always yields an α-stable
matching for the markets in a corresponding class. Table 1 (c) summarizes the upper and lower
bounds of the approximation ratios that we obtained. Note that Theorem 8 provides a basis to
derive some novel lower bounds. Here, for the knapsack constraints, we assume that the weight of
each element on every dimension is at most a (1− ǫ) fraction of the total capacity.
Table 1: Summary of results (k ≥ 3 and ρ ≥ 2)
(a) Complexity of checking the stability
Constraints
Hosp. Utils
Cardinality Additive Submodular
Capacity P P coNP-c
Matroid P　　　 P coNP-c
2-mat. int. P P coNP-c
k-mat. int. coNP-c coNP-c coNP-c
1-dim. knap. P coNP-c † coNP-c
ρ-dim. knap. coNP-c coNP-c coNP-c
(b) Complexity of checking existence
Constraints
Hosp. Utils
Cardinality Additive Submodular
Capacity P * P * ΣP2 -c
b
Matroid P * P * ΣP2 -c
b
2-mat. int. NP-c a NP-c a ΣP2 -c
b
k-mat. int. ΣP2 -c
c ΣP2 -c
c ΣP2 -c
b,c
1-dim. knap. P ‡ ΣP2 -c
† ΣP2 -c
†,b
ρ-dim. knap. ΣP2 -c
d ΣP2 -c
†,d ΣP2 -c
†,b,d
(c) Approximation ratios (Upper Bound
/
Lower Bound)
Constraints
Hosp. Utils
Cardinality Additive Submodular
Capacity 1 *
/
1 1 *
/
1 4 g
/
1.28 l
Matroid 1 *
/
1 1 *
/
1 4 g
/
1.28 l
2-matroid int. 2 e
/
2 k (
√
2+1)2 f
/
2 k 8 g
/
2 k
k-matroid int. k e
/
2 k (
√
k+
√
k−1)2 f / k m 4k g / k m
1-dim. knap. 1 ‡
/
1 1ǫ
‡
/
1
ǫ
‡ O( 1ǫ2 )
j
/
1
2ǫ
n
ρ-dim. knap. ρ h
/
2 k ρǫ
i
/ ρ
2ǫ
n O( ρ
ǫ2
) j
/ ρ
2ǫ
n
* [22]; † [15]; ‡ [20]; a Thm. 5; b Thm. 2; c Thm. 3; d Thm. 4; e Cor. 1; f Cor. 2; g Cor. 3; h Cor. 4; i Cor. 5;
j Cor. 6; k Ex. 1; l Ex. 2; m Thm. 9; n Thm. 10.
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2 Model
This section describes our model of two-sided matching markets. A market is a tuple (D,H,≻D,
uH ,IH) where each component is defined as follows. There is a finite set of doctorsD = {d1, . . . , dn}
and a finite set of hospitals H = {h1, . . . , hm}. We denote by ≻D= (≻d)d∈D the doctors’ preference
profile where ≻d is the strict relation of d ∈ D over H∪{∅}; s ≻d t means that d strictly prefers s to
t, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. Let uH = (uh)h∈H denote the hospitals’ cardinal preference
profile where uh is the utility function uh : 2
D → R+. We assume that uh is normalized (i.e.,
uh(∅) = 0) and monotone (i.e., uh(D′′) ≤ uh(D′) for any D′′ ⊆ D′ ⊆ D). Let IH = (Ih)h∈H denote
the feasibility constraints for hospitals where Ih ⊆ 2D for each h ∈ H. We assume that (D,Ih)
is an independence system for each h ∈ H, i.e., (I1) ∅ ∈ Ih and (I2) S ⊆ T ∈ Ih implies S ∈ Ih.
Here, Ih is called an independence family. We say that h ∈ H is acceptable to d ∈ D if h ≻d ∅. In
addition, D′ ⊆ D is said to be feasible to h ∈ H if D′ ∈ Ih.
Note that a pair of utility uh and constraint Ih can be represented by a single (non-monotone)
utility function uˆh : 2
D → R ∪ {−∞} such that uˆh(X) = uh(X) if X ∈ Ih and uˆ(X) = −∞
otherwise. However, we treat it separately to define classes of markets clearly.
For a set of utility functions U and a set of independence families Γ, a market (D,H,≻D, uH ,IH)
is (U ,Γ)-market if uh ∈ U and Ih ∈ Γ for all h ∈ H. Namely, the (U ,Γ)-markets are those in which
the utilities and the feasibility constraints are restricted to be in U and Γ, respectively. We analyze
the properties of the (U ,Γ)-markets based on utility class U and constraint class Γ.
A matching is a set of pairs µ ⊆ {(d, h) ∈ D×H | h ≻d ∅} such that each doctor appears in at
most one pair of µ; that is, we have
∣∣{(d′, h′) ∈ µ | d′ = d}∣∣ ≤ 1 for any d ∈ D. For d ∈ D, h ∈ H,
and a matching µ ⊆ D ×H, we define µ(h) := {d′ | (d′, h) ∈ µ} (⊆ D) and µ(d) := s (∈ H ∪ {∅})
where s ∈ H if (d, s) ∈ µ and s = ∅ otherwise.
We call matching µ feasible if µ(h) ∈ Ih for all h ∈ H. Given a matching µ and a real α ≥ 1, a
set of doctors D′ ∈ Ih is an α-blocking coalition for hospital h if (i) h d µ(d) for any d ∈ D′ and
(ii) uh(D
′) > α · uh(µ(h)).1 We then obtain a stability concept.
Definition 1 ([3]). A feasible matching µ is α-stable if there exists no α-blocking coalition.
Note that 1-stability is equivalent to the standard stability concept. As we will see in Examples 1
and 2, 1-stable matching may not exist in general. Intuitively, α-stable means that the hospitals
are only willing to change the assignments for a multiplicative improvement of α. This idea regards
the value of α as a switching cost for the hospitals.
2.1 Classes of Utilities and Constraints
Here, we formally describe three important classes of utility functions: cardinality, additive, and
submodular, which capture wide varieties of applications. We assume that utility functions are
monotone and nonnegative throughout this paper. First, a utility function u : 2D → R+ is called
cardinality if u(D′) = |D′| for all D′ ⊆ D. Let us denote Ucard as a set of cardinality utility
functions. Second, it is called additive (or modular) if u(D′) =
∑
d∈D′ u(d) holds for all D
′ ⊆ D
(where we denote u({d}) by u(d) for simplicity). Third, it is called submodular if u(D′)+ u(D′′) ≥
u(D′ ∪ D′′) + u(D′ ∩ D′′) holds for all D′,D′′ ⊆ D (see [12] for more details). As well as for
1Although the second condition can also be defined in an additive manner: u(X ′′) > u(X ′h) + α, scale invariance
should be required. For example, when a market has no α-stable matching in the additive sense, a market with the
hospitals’ utilities that are multiplied by 100 has no 100α-stable matching.
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the cardinality functions, we define the set of additive and submodular utilities as Uadd and Usub,
respectively. Here, Ucard ( Uadd ( Usub inevitably holds.
Next, we formally define three classes of constraints: capacity, matroid intersection, and mul-
tidimensional knapsack. An independence system (D,I) represents a capacity constraint of rank
r if I = {D′ ⊆ D | |D′| ≤ r}. We define the set of independence families that represent rank r
capacities as Γ
(r)
cap. Also, we denote Γcap as
⋃
r∈Z+
Γ
(r)
cap. This class represents a standard matching
model with maximum quotas.
An independence system (D,I) is called matroid if, for D′,D′′ ∈ I, |D′| < |D′′| implies the
existence of d ∈ D′′ \ D′ such that D′ ∪ {d} ∈ I. Moreover, it is called k-matroid intersection if
there exist k matroids (D,I1), . . . , (D,Ik) such that I = ⋂i∈[k] I i, where [k] denotes set {1, . . . , k}.
We denote the set of independence families of the k-matroid intersection as Γ
(k)
mat.
Note that we have Γcap ( Γ
(1)
mat ( Γ
(2)
mat ( · · · . We assume that each independence system (D,I)
in Γ
(k)
mat is represented by
⋂
i∈[k] I i with matroids (D,I i) (i ∈ [k]), and every I i (i ∈ [k]) is given as
a compact representation. For more details on matroids, see, e.g., [28].
Furthermore, for a natural number ρ and a positive real ǫ, the set of ρ-dimensional knapsack
with ǫ-slack Γ
(ρ,ǫ)
knap is defined as the set of independence families I that can be represented as
I = {D′ ⊆ D ∣∣ ∑d∈D′ w(d, i) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [ρ]}
with weights w(d, i) ∈ [0, 1 − ǫ] for each d ∈ D and i ∈ [ρ]. We assume that independence systems
(D,I) in Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap are given by weights.
Note that every independence system can be represented by a matroid intersection and a mul-
tidimensional knapsack. The representability of matroid intersection is not stronger than that of
multidimensional knapsack, and vice versa. Formally, Γ
(1)
mat 6⊆ Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap and Γ(1,ǫ)knap 6⊆ Γ(k)mat for any
positive integers ρ and k and any nonnegative real ǫ < 1.
For independence system (D,I) and subset A ⊆ D, the restriction of (D,I) to A is defined as
I|A := {X | A ⊇ X ∈ I}. In this paper, we only consider a constraint class Γ that is closed under
the restriction, i.e., I ∈ Γ implies I|D′ ∈ Γ for all D′ ⊆ D. We remark that Γ(r)cap, Γ(k)mat, and Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap
satisfy the condition.
2.2 Applications
This section illustrates several existing and critical situations raised in the literature of matchings
with constraints and describes how our constraint representation (the feasible subsets of doctors)
is reduced to such situations.
Type-specific quotas One of the simplest examples of the feasibility family is type-specific quotas,
in which doctors are partitioned based on their types, and each hospital has type-specific quotas
in addition to its capacity [1]. Fix hospital h and suppose that (Dt)t∈T is the partition of doctors
with types T , i.e.,
⋃
t∈T Dt = D and Dt ∩Dt′ = ∅ for all t, t′ ∈ T with t 6= t′. Let q ∈ Z+ be the
capacity of h, and let qt ∈ Z+ be the quota for type t ∈ T . Then D′ (⊆ D) belongs to Ih if and
only if |D′| ≤ q and |D′ ∩Dt| ≤ qt for every t ∈ T . In this case, (D,Ih) is a matroid, and if the
utilities are additive, a 1-stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently. If the utilities
are submodular, the matching no longer exists (see Example 2). However, we reveal that a 4-stable
matching always exists and is efficiently found (Theorem 3).
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Overlapping types Here, we generalize the type-specific quotas to those where each doctor can
simultaneously belong to multiple types [24]. Fix hospital h and let T1, . . . , Tk be the sets of types.
For i ∈ [k], let (Dit)t∈Ti be the partition of doctors with types Ti. In addition, let q ∈ Z+ be the
capacity of h, and let qit ∈ Z+ be the quota for type t ∈ Ti. Then D′ (⊆ D) belongs to Ih if and
only if |D′| ≤ q and |D′ ∩Dit| ≤ qit for every i ∈ [k] and t ∈ Ti. In this case, (D,Ih) is a k-matroid
intersection. Kurata et al. [24] treated quotas as soft constraints that can be violated and found a
quasi-stable matching in a different manner. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to treat
them as hard constraints that should be precisely satisfied and for finding an approximately stable
matching.
Budget constraints Under budget constraints, one side (a firm or hospital) can make monetary
transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor), and each hospital has a fixed budget; that
is, the total amount of wages allocated by each hospital to doctors is constrained [2, 20, 21]. Let
wh(d) be the offered wage from hospital h to doctor d, and let bh be its budget. Then constraint
Ih is defined as I = {D′ ⊆ D |
∑
d∈D′ w
h(d) ≤ bh} and becomes a 1-dimensional knapsack. In fact,
we have Ih ∈ Γ(1,ǫ)knap with ǫ = 1−maxd∈D wh(d)/bh. Kawase and Iwasaki [21] considered up to the
additive utility case and we disentangled the submodular utility case.
Refugee match (multiple resource constraints) In refugee resettlement, different refugee
families require such various services as school seats, hospital beds, slots in language classes, and
employment training programs [9]. Suppose that the set of services is Σ and the capacity of h
(local areas in this context) is bhs for each s ∈ Σ. In addition, each doctor (refugee family) d
needs wh(d, s) units of service s ∈ Σ. Then, the feasibility constraint of hospital h is defined:
Ih = {D′ ⊆ D |
∑
d∈D′ w
h(d, s) ≤ bhs (∀s ∈ Σ)}. In this case, the constraint is a |Σ|-dimensional
knapsack. In fact, we have Ih ∈ Γ(|Σ|,ǫh)knap with ǫh = 1−maxs∈Σmaxd∈D wh(d, s)/bhs .
2.3 Market without Stable Matchings
Let us show a market may not have 1-stable matchings, even when the utilities are cardinality.
Example 1. Consider a market with four doctors D := {d1, d2, d3, d4} and two hospitals H :=
{h1, h2}. The preferences of the doctors are h1 ≻di h2 ≻di ∅ for i = 1, 2 and h2 ≻di h1 ≻di ∅
for i = 3, 4. Suppose that each hospital has a cardinality utility. The feasibility families are
Ih1 := 2{d1,d3} ∪ 2{d2,d4} and Ih2 := 2{d1,d4} ∪ 2{d2,d3}. Then, it is straightforward to see that, for
1 ≤ α < 2, this market has no α-stable matching (see Proposition 1 in Appendix for the formal
proof).
Let us remark that the independence systems (D,Ih1) and (D,Ih2) can be represented by a 2-
matroid intersection and a 2-dimensional knapsack with ǫ (< 1/2). For example, Ih1 is in Γ(2)mat
because Ih1 = I1 ∩ I2 for
I1 =
{
Dˆ ⊆ D
∣∣∣ |Dˆ∩{d1,d2}|≤1,
|Dˆ∩{d3,d4}|≤1
}
and I2 =
{
Dˆ ⊆ D
∣∣∣ |Dˆ∩{d1,d4}|≤1,
|Dˆ∩{d2,d3}|≤1
}
.
Further, Ih1 is in Γ(2,ǫ)knap because it is represented by the following weights:
w(d1, 1) = 1− ǫ, w(d2, 1) = 1/2, w(d3, 1) = 0, w(d4, 1) = 1/2,
w(d1, 2) = 0, w(d2, 2) = 1/2, w(d3, 2) = 1− ǫ, w(d4, 2) = 1/2.
Moreover, if hospitals’ utilities are submodular, a market fails to have 1-stable matchings even
under capacity constraints.
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Example 2. Consider a market with four doctors D := {d1, d2, d3, d4} and two hospitals H :=
{h1, h2}. The preferences of the doctors are h1 ≻di ∅ ≻di h2 for i = 1, 2, h2 ≻d3 h1 ≻d3 ∅,
and h1 ≻d4 h2 ≻d4 ∅. Suppose the Ih1 and Ih2 are capacity constraints of rank 2 and rank 1,
respectively. Let uh1 be a submodular utility such that uh1(D
′) :=
∑
e∈
⋃
di∈D
′ Ai
w(e) where A1 =
{a1, a3}, A2 = {a2, a4}, A3 = {a3, a4, a5}, A4 = {a1, a2}, w(a1) = w(a2) = w(a5) = 4, and
w(a3) = w(a4) =
√
17− 1. Here, uh1 is clearly submodular since it is a weighted-coverage function.
Let uh2 be an additive utility such that uh2(d3) = 1 and uh2(d4) = 2. Then, it is straightforward to
see that, there exists no (1 +
√
17)/4 (≈ 1.28)-stable matching in this market (see Proposition 2 in
Appendix for the formal proof).
3 Checking the Stability of a Given Matching
In this section, we discuss the computational complexity of checking the α-stability of a given
matching. We are going to prove that the problem is equivalent to computing an offline packing
problem which finds an outcome or allocation X ∈ I that maximizes a given utility u(X). Note
that u and I are given from U and Γ. Formally, we call it the (U ,Γ)-packing problem, which
corresponds with a (U ,Γ)-market.
Theorem 1. Fix a set of utility functions U and a set of independence families Γ. If the (U ,Γ)-
packing problem is solvable in polynomial time, then the α-stability of a given matching in a (U ,Γ)-
market can be checked in polynomial time for any α (≥ 1). If it is coNP-hard to determine whether
a given solution to an instance of the (U ,Γ)-packing problem is α-approximate, then it is coNP-hard
to test whether a given matching is α-stable in a (U ,Γ)-market.
Proof. We first prove the former part. Let (D,H,≻D, uH ,IH) be a (U ,Γ)-market and let µ ⊆ D×H
be a matching. Then µ is α-stable if and only if
α · u(µ(h)) ≥ max{u(D′) ∣∣ D′ ∈ Ih|Dh}
for all h ∈ H, where Dh := {d ∈ D | h d µ(d)} and Ih|Dh is the restriction Ih to Dh. The
right-hand side value is computed in polynomial time if the corresponding (U ,Γ)-packing problem
is solvable in polynomial time. Thus, the α-stability is checked efficiently.
Next, we give a reduction to prove the latter part. For an instance (u,I) of the (U ,Γ)-packing
problem, let us consider a (U ,Γ)-market with doctors D and one hospital H := {h∗}. Suppose that
h∗ ≻d ∅ for all d ∈ D, uh∗ := u, and Ih∗ := I. We then reduce the (U ,Γ)-market to (D,H,≻D,
uH ,IH). Moreover, matching µ is α-stable if and only if uh∗(µ(h∗)) is an α-approximation of
max {u(D′) | D′ ∈ Ih∗}. Thus the claim holds.
The theorem enables us to access the proficiency of packing problems. For example, since
the (Uadd,Γ(2)mat)-packing problem (i.e., the weighted matroid intersection problem) is solvable in
polynomial time [10], one can efficiently check the α-stability of a given matching in a (Uadd,Γ(2)mat)-
market. Garey and Johnson [13] provided the coNP-completeness of several packing problems.
They notify us that checking the stability of a matching is coNP-complete in the corresponding
markets, summarized in Table 1 (a).
6
4 Hardness of Computing a Stable Matching
In this section, we discuss the negative side of computing an α-stable matching. Kojima et al. [22]
reveals that we can efficiently find a 1-stable matching for any (Uadd,Γ(1)mat)-market and Kawase
and Iwasaki [20] proves the same for (Ucard,Γ(1,0)knap)-market. In general, the existence problems we
consider belong to ΣP2 , since yes-instance can be verified by checking the stability of a guessed
1-stable matching with the NP-oracle.
We can say that it is NP-hard to find (or determine the nonexistence of) an α-stable matching
in a (U ,Γ)-market if it is NP-hard to compute an α-approximate solution to a (U ,Γ)-packing
instance, by applying the similar argument in Theorem 1. Furthermore, we can conclude that the
existence problem for the hard cases are all ΣP2 -complete. Note that the Σ
P
2 -completeness for the
(Uadd,Γ(1)knap)-markets has shown by Hamada et al. [15]. We prove the hardness for the other cases
by reductions from the ∃∀3DM or ∃∀SubsetSum, which are ΣP2 -complete [5, 26].
∃∀3DM We are given three disjoint sets X1,X2,X3 of the same cardinality, and two disjoint subsets
S∃, S∀ ⊆ X1 × X2 × X3. Our task is to determine whether there exists T ∃ ⊆ S∃ so that
T ∃ ∪ T ∀ is not a matching for any T ∀ ⊆ S∀.
∃∀SubsetSum We are given two disjoint sets S∃, S∀ with weights a : S∃ ∪S∀ → Z+, and an integer
q. Our task is to determine whether there exists T ∃ ⊆ S∃ so that ∑e∈T∃∪T∀ a(e) 6= q for any
T ∀ ⊆ S∀.
We show Theorems 2 and 3 by reductions from ∃∀3DM and Theorem 4 by a reduction from
∃∀SubsetSum.
Theorem 2. It is ΣP2 -hard to decide whether a given (Usub,Γcap)-market has a 1-stable matching.
Theorem 3. It is ΣP2 -hard to decide whether a given (Ucard,Γ(3)mat)-market has a 1-stable matching.
Theorem 4. It is ΣP2 -hard to decide whether a given (Ucard,Γ(2)knap)-market has a 1-stable matching.
Proof. Here we only provide a proof for Theorem 2. Proofs for Theorems 3 and 4 can be obtained
in similar ways (formal proofs are shown in Appendix B).
We give a reduction from ∃∀3DM. Suppose that disjoint sets S∃, S∀ ⊆ X1 ×X2 ×X3 are given
as an instance of ∃∀3DM.
We construct a (Usub,Γcap)-market that has a 1-stable matching if and only if the given instance
is a yes-instance. Consider a market (D,H,≻D, uH ,IH) with D := {d1, d2, d3, d4} ∪ {de}e∈S∃∪S∀
and H := {h∗, h1, h2} ∪ {he}e∈S∃ . The doctors’ preferences over the acceptable hospitals are given
as:
• de : he, h∗ (e ∈ S∃),
• de : h∗ (e ∈ S∀),
• d1 : h∗, h1,
• d2 : h1,
• d3 : h2, h1,
• d4 : h1, h2.
Here, and henceforth, preference lists are ordered from left to right in decreasing order of preference.
The feasibility constraint is the capacity constraint of rank 1 for h2 and h
e (e ∈ S∀), rank 2 for h1,
and rank |X1| (= |X2| = |X3|) for h∗. Suppose that uh1 and uh2 are the same as Example 2 (the
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utilities of unmatchable doctors are considered to be zero), and uhe is identically zero (∀e ∈ S∃).
In addition, for X ⊆ D, we define
uh∗(X) :=
∣∣∣⋃d(x1,x2,x3)∈X\{d1,d2,d3,d4}{x1, x2, x3}
∣∣∣+ 2|X ∩ {d1}|.
This is a weighted-coverage function and hence submodular.
Consider the case when the instance is a yes-instance. We show that there exists a 1-stable
matching in this case. Let Tˆ ∃ ⊆ S∃ be a certificate of the instance. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that |Tˆ ∃| ≤ |X1| − 1, |Tˆ ∃|+ |S∀| ≥ |X1|, and Tˆ ∃ is a matching. Let
Tˆ ∀ ∈ argmax
{
uh∗
({de}e∈Tˆ∃ ∪ {de}e∈T∀) ∣∣∣ |Tˆ ∃|+ |T ∀| = |X1|, T ∀ ⊆ S∀}.
Then, Tˆ ∃ ∪ Tˆ ∀ is not a matching, and hence there exists e∗ ∈ Tˆ ∀ such that
uh∗
({de}e∈Tˆ∃ ∪ {de}e∈Tˆ∀) ≤ uh∗({de}e∈Tˆ∃ ∪ {de}e∈Tˆ∀\{e∗})+ 2.
Thus, the matching
µ∗ ={(de, h∗)}e∈Tˆ∃ ∪ {(de, h∗)}e∈Tˆ∀\{e∗} ∪ {(de, he)}e∈S∃\Tˆ∃ ∪ {(d1, h∗), (d2, h1), (d3, h2), (d4, h1)}
is 1-stable.
Conversely, consider the case when the instance is a no-instance. We show that there exists no
1-stable matching in this case. Suppose to the contrary that µ is a 1-stable matching. Then, µ
must contain (d1, h
∗) since the submarket induced by {d1, d2, d3, d4} and {h1, h2} is equivalent to
Example 2 (which has no 1-stable matching). Hence, uh∗(µ(h
∗)) ≤ 3|X1| − 1. Let T˜ ∃ = {e ∈ S∃ |
de ∈ µ(h∗)}. Since the instance is a no-instance, there exists T˜ ∀ ⊆ S∀ such that |T˜ ∃|+ |T˜ ∀| = |X1|
and T˜ ∃ ∪ T˜ ∀ is a matching. Thus, we have uh∗
({de}e∈T˜∃ ∪ {de}e∈T˜∀) = 3|X1|, which implies that
T˜ ∃ ∪ T˜ ∀ is a 1-blocking coalition for h∗.
Now the remaining cases to be treated are (Ucard,Γ(2)mat)- and (Uadd,Γ(2)mat)-markets. For a
(Uadd,Γ(2)mat)-market, although the α-stability (especially 1-stability) of a given matching can be
checked in polynomial time by Theorem 1, the existence problem becomes NP-complete, even if util-
ities are restricted to cardinality. We prove the NP-hardness by a reduction from DisjointMatching,
which is NP-complete [11].
DisjointMatching We are given two bipartite graphs, (S, T ;A1) and (S, T ;A2) with |S| = |T |,
and our task is to determine whether perfect matchings M1 ⊆ A1 and M2 ⊆ A2 exist such
that M1 ∩M2 = ∅.
Theorem 5. It is NP-complete to decide whether a given (Ucard,Γ(2)mat)-market has a 1-stable match-
ing or not.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP, since one can efficiently check the 1-stability of a given
matching in a (Ucard,Γ(2)mat)-market.
We give a reduction from DisjointMatching to prove NP-hardness. Let (S, T ;A1) and (S, T ;A2)
be the bipartite graphs of a given disjoint matching instance and let A1∪A2 = {a1, . . . , aℓ}. Without
loss of generality, we assume that |A1 ∪A2| ≥ 2|S|.
We construct a market that has a 1-stable matching if and only if the given instance has disjoint
perfect matchings. Consider a market (D,H,≻D, uH ,IH) with 4ℓ doctors D :=
⋃ℓ
k=1{dk1 , dk2 , dk3 , dk4}
and 2ℓ+3 hospitals H := {h1, h2, h3}∪
⋃ℓ
k=1{hk1 , hk2}. The doctors’ preferences over the acceptable
hospitals are given as:
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• dk1 : h1, h2, h3, h1k, h2k (k ∈ [ℓ]),
• dk2 : hk1 , hk2 (k ∈ [ℓ]),
• dk3 : hk2 , hk1 (k ∈ [ℓ]),
• dk4 : hk2 , hk1 (k ∈ [ℓ]).
Suppose that each hospital has the cardinality utility. We equate each doctor dk1 ∈ D with edge
ak ∈ A1 ∪A2. Then, the feasibility constraint for each hospital is defined:
• Ih1 := {D′ ⊆ A1 | D′ is a matching in (S, T ;A1)},
• Ih2 := {D′ ⊆ A2 | D′ is a matching in (S, T ;A2)},
• Ih3 := {D′ ⊆ A1 ∪A2 | |D′| ≤ |A1 ∪A2| − 2|S|},
• Ihk1 := 2
{dk1 ,d
k
3} ∪ 2{dk2 ,dk4} (k ∈ [ℓ]),
• Ihk2 := 2
{dk1 ,d
k
4} ∪ 2{dk2 ,dk3} (k ∈ [ℓ]).
Note that each feasible family can be represented as an intersection of two matroids.
Consider the case when the instance has disjoint perfect matchings. LetM1 ⊆ A1 and M2 ⊆ A2
be the matchings. Then
µ ={(d, h1)}d∈M1 ∪ {(d, h2)}d∈M2 ∪ {(d, h3)}d∈(A1∪A2)\(M1∪M2) ∪
⋃ℓ
k=1{(dk2 , hk1), (dk3 , hk2), (dk4 , hk1)}
is a 1-stable matching.
Conversely, consider the case when the instance has no disjoint perfect matchings. Let µ be
a feasible matching. Then, there exists a doctor dk1 such that µ(d
k
1) 6∈ {h1, h2, h3}. In this case,
µ is not 1-stable since doctors {dk1 , dk2 , dk3 , dk4} and hospitals {hk1 , hk2} form the same market as in
Example 1.
5 Approximability of Stable Matchings
To deal with the nonexistence or the hardness of stable matchings, we focus on an approximately
stable matching where stability may be violated to some extent. This section pays an attention
to an online version of packing problems, i.e., online packing problems (with cancellation) and
incorporates the proficiency into a variant of generalized deferred acceptance (GDA) algorithm [16]
in such a manner that choice functions of hospitals are replaced with an online packing algorithm.
We establish a framework so that the bounds of the algorithms become consistent with how much
stability is violated. Note that Kawase and Iwasaki [21] apply a similar idea for budget constraints,
that is, 1-dimensional knapsack with ǫ-slack constraints.
In what follows, we consider algorithms that take a market as input and yield an approximately
stable matching as output. An algorithm is called α-stable if it always produces an α-stable
matching for a certain α.
5.1 Online Packing Problem
Let us briefly introduce an online packing problem, which is a generalization of several online
problems such as an online removable knapsack problem [17]. Its instance consists of a set of
elements D = {d1, . . . , dn}, a utility function u : 2D → R+, and a feasibility family I ⊆ 2D. We
assume that u is monotone and I is an independence family. Elements in D are given to an online
algorithm Alg one by one in an unknown order. When an element is presented, the algorithm must
accept or reject it immediately without knowledge about the ordering of future elements. Although
accepted elements can be canceled, the elements that are once rejected (or canceled) can never be
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Algorithm 1: Generalized DA algorithm
input: D,H, (≻d)d∈D, (Algh)h∈H output: matching µ
1 µ← ∅, Rd ← H (∀d ∈ D);
2 L← {d ∈ D | max≻d(Rd ∪ {∅}) 6= ∅};
3 a
h ← () for all h ∈ H;
4 while L 6= ∅ do
5 pick d ∈ L arbitrarily and let h← max≻d Rd;
6 append d to the end of ah;
7 µ← {(d′, h′) ∈ µ | h′ 6= h} ∪Algh(ah);
8 Rd ← Rd \ {h};
9 L← {d ∈ D | max≻d(Rd ∪ {µ(d)}) 6= µ(d)};
10 return µ;
recovered. The set of selected elements must be feasible in each round. Suppose that elements are
given according to order σ, which is a bijection from [n] to D. We denote by Alg(σ(1), . . . , σ(i))
the set of selected elements at the end of the ith round, in which σ(i) ∈ D arrives. We denote it
as Alg(σ, i) for brevity. Then we have Alg(σ, 0) = ∅, and Alg(σ, i − 1) ∪ {σ(i)} ⊇ Alg(σ, i) ∈ I
holds for every i ∈ [n]. In addition, for i ∈ [n] and the two orders of elements σ and τ , equality
Alg(σ, i) = Alg(τ, i) holds if σ(j) = τ(j) for any j ∈ [i]. Our task is to maximize value u(Alg(σ, i))
for unknown order σ and i (∈ [n]).
The performance of an online algorithm is measured by the competitive ratio. Denote
OPT(σ, i) ∈ argmax{u(S) ∣∣ S ∈ I|{σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}}.
Online algorithm Alg is called α-competitive (α ≥ 1) if
α · u(Alg(σ, i)) ≥ u(OPT(σ, i))
for any σ and i. An online (U ,Γ)-packing problem is called α-competitive if an α-competitive
algorithm exists for any instance of it.
5.2 Generalized Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
We use a modified version of the generalized DA algorithm, which is formally described in Algo-
rithm 1. In GDA, each doctor is initialized to be unmatched. Then an unmatched doctor makes a
proposal to her most preferred hospital h that has not rejected her yet. Let ah be the ordered list of
proposed doctors to h. Then it chooses a set of doctors according to the output of online algorithm
Algh(a
h). The proposal procedure continues as long as an unmatched doctor has a non-rejected
acceptable hospital.
The next theorem guarantees that if Algh is α-competitive for each h ∈ H, then Algorithm 1 is
α-stable.2
Theorem 6. If the online (U ,Γ)-packing problem is α-competitive, then an α-stable algorithm
exists for the (U ,Γ)-markets.
2Although the output of Algorithm 1 depends on the order of doctors selected in Line 5, this claim holds regardless
of the order.
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Proof. We prove that the output µ is an α-stable matching by contradiction. Suppose that D′ ⊆ D
is an α-blocking coalition for h. Then, we have uh(D
′) > α · uh(µ(h)) = α · uh(Algh(ah)) and
h d µ(d) for all d ∈ D′. By the definition of the algorithm, h d µ(d) implies that d is in ah.
Hence, we have α · uh(Algh(ah)) ≥ uh(OPTh(ah)) ≥ uh(D′) since Alg is α-competitive. This is a
contradiction.
This theorem assures that if there exists an online packing algorithm in a setting, we can
construct a stable algorithm in the corresponding market with it.
Let us first apply a greedy algorithm to a matching problem for k-matroid constraints: Start
from the empty solution and add an element to the current solution if and only if its addition
preserves feasibility. If the utilities are cardinality, it is a k-competitive algorithm [18, 23]. By
Theorem 6, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. There exists a k-stable algorithm for the (Ucard,Γ(k)mat)-markets.
Hence, Algorithm 2 is k-competitive for the online (Ucard,Γ(k)mat)-packing problem.3
Algorithm 2:
input: σ(1), . . . , σ(i) output: Alg(σ(1), . . . , σ(i))
1 if i = 0 then return ∅;
2 let Y ← Alg(σ(1), . . . , σ(i − 1)) ∪ {σ(i)};
3 if Y ∈ I then return Y ;
4 else return Alg(σ(1), . . . , σ(i − 1));
However, we require more sophisticated packing algorithms in the online setting to handle the
additive or submodular utility case.
For the additive case, a (
√
k +
√
k − 1)2-competitive algorithm was given by Ashwinkumar [4].
For the submodular case, a 4k-competitive algorithm was given by Chakrabarti and Kale [6]. Thus,
we obtain the following corollaries:
Corollary 2. There exists a (
√
k +
√
k − 1)2-stable algorithm for the (Uadd,Γ(k)mat)-markets.
Corollary 3. There exists a 4k-stable matching algorithm for the (Usub,Γ(k)mat)-markets.
Next, let us consider ρ-dimensional knapsack constraints with ǫ-slack. To the best of our
knowledge, no suitable online packing algorithm has been proposed for the cardinality or addi-
tive utility case. We develop a simple greedy algorithm, which is formally given as Algorithm 3.
Intuitively, the algorithm chooses doctors according to decreasing order of utility per largest size
u(d)/maxi∈[ρ]w(d, i). It is not difficult to see that the algorithm is ρ-competitive for the cardinal-
ity utility case and ρ/ǫ-competitive for the additive utility case. We provide the formal proof in
Appendix C.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 3 is ρ-competitive for the online (Ucard,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-packing problem and ρ/ǫ-
competitive for the online (Uadd,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-packing problem.
3This claim can be generalized to the case when the set of independence families is the k-system, which is an
extension of k-matroid intersection. An independence system (D, I) is called a k-system if for all S ⊆ D, the ratio of
the cardinality of the largest to the smallest maximal independent subset of S is at most k.
11
Algorithm 3:
input: σ(1), . . . , σ(i) output: Alg(σ(1), . . . , σ(i))
1 if i = 0 then return ∅;
2 let Y ← Alg(σ(1), . . . , σ(i − 1)) ∪ {σ(i)};
3 while
∑
d∈Y maxi∈[ρ]w(d, i) > 1 do
4 Y ← Y \ {a} with a ∈ argmind∈Y u(d)maxi∈[ρ]w(d,i) ;
5 return Y ;
Accordingly, in conjunction with Theorem 6, we obtain the following corollaries.
Corollary 4. There exists a ρ-stable algorithm for the (Ucard,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-markets.
Corollary 5. There exists a ρǫ -stable algorithm for the (Uadd,Γ
(ρ,ǫ)
knap)-markets.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to generalize the greedy algorithm to the submodular utility case.
However, we can borrow an O(ρ/ǫ2)-competitive algorithm for the online (Usub,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-packing
problem [7] and provide the following corollary.
Corollary 6. There exists an O(ρ/ǫ2)-stable algorithm for the (Usub,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-markets.
6 Inapproximability of Stable Matchings
In this section, we show some inapproximability results, i.e., lower bounds. As we saw in Example 1,
if utilities are cardinality and constraints are given from Γ
(2)
mat∩Γ(2,ǫ)knap, for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2), there exists
no α-stable algorithm whose approximation ratio is better than two (α < 2). Also, Kawase and
Iwasaki [21] derive the lower bound for the case of additive utilities and 1-dimensional knapsack
with ǫ-slack constraints. There exists a market that has no α-stable matching with α < 1/ǫ if
ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2).
To fill up the remaining shown in Table 1 (c), we now provide a basis for deriving lower bounds.
The next theorem reveals that given an α-competitive algorithm for an online (U ,Γ)-packing prob-
lem, the bound is equivalent to the extent to which stability is violated in the corresponding market.
To this end, we have to restrict the input orderings. One might think that this makes the online
problem too easy. However, without the restriction, we cannot directly use the lower bounds of the
competitive ratio for the original online problem. Roughly speaking, we partition elements D to
D1, . . . ,Ds and only consider input sequences such that, if an online algorithm rejects an element
in Dt for each t ∈ [s], then a new element in Dt is given to the algorithm. In addition, we require
that the (U ,Γ)-markets allow hospitals to have any additive utilities and the rank one capacity.
Theorem 8. Suppose that U is a set of utilities and Γ is a set of independence families such that
Uadd ⊆ U and Γ(1)cap ⊆ Γ. Let (Dˆ, uˆ, Iˆ) be a (U ,Γ)-packing instance, let D1, . . . ,Ds be a partition of
Dˆ with Dt = {dt1, . . . , dtrt} for each t ∈ [s] (where rt = |Dt|), and let q1, . . . , qs be positive integers
such that qt ≤ rt for each t ∈ [s]. We define
cl(D′) :=
⋃
t∈[s]
{
dti ∈ Dt
∣∣∣ |D′ ∩Dt| < qt or i ≤ max
dtj∈D
′∩Dt
j
}
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and A := {D′ ⊆ Dˆ | |D′ ∩ Dt| ≤ qt (∀t ∈ [s])}. Then, there exists no α-stable algorithm for
the (U ,Γ)-markets if there exists no α-competitive algorithm for the online packing problem with
restricted input sequences, i.e.,
α · uˆ(D′) < max{uˆ(D′′) | D′′ ∈ Iˆ|cl(D′)}, (1)
for any D′ ∈ Iˆ ∩ A.
Proof. Suppose that (1) holds for anyD′ ∈ I∩A. We set hospitals asH := {h∗}∪⋃t∈[s]{htqt+1, . . . , htrt}.
Each doctor’s preference over her acceptable hospitals is defined as:
• ≻dti : h∗, htqt+1, . . . , htrt (t ∈ [s], i ∈ [qt]),
• ≻dti : hti, h∗, hti+1, . . . , htrt (t ∈ [s], i ∈ [rt] \ [qt]).
Suppose that uh∗(D
′) = uˆ(D′) (∀D′ ⊆ D) and each hospital hti has an additive utility function
such that uhti(d
t
j) = (α + 1)
−j (t ∈ [s], i ∈ [rt] \ [qt], j ∈ [rt]). The feasibility constraint of each
hospital is defined as: Ih∗ = Iˆ and Ihti = {D′ ⊆ D | |D′| ≤ 1} (t ∈ [s], i ∈ [rt]). Note that
(D,H,≻D, uH ,IH) is a (U ,Γ)-market.
In what follows, we claim that no α-stable matching exists in market (D,H,≻D, uH ,IH) if (1)
holds. Suppose, contrary to our claim, that µ is an α-stable matching.
We show that h∗ d µ(d) if d ∈ cl(µ(h∗)). Fix t ∈ [s] and let Dt \ µ(h∗) = {dtσ(1), . . . , dtσ(ℓ)}
with ℓ = |Dt \µ(h∗)| and σ(1) < · · · < σ(ℓ). It is worth mentioning that σ(i) ≤ qt+ i for all i ∈ [ℓ].
By uhtqt+1
(dtσ(1)) > α ·uhtqt+1 and σ(i) ≤ qt+1, we have µ(h
t
qt+1) = d
t
σ(1). Similarly, by induction we
conclude that µ(htqt+i) = d
t
σ(i) for all i ∈ [ℓ]. Here, we have µ(dti) ≻dti h∗ if and only if i = σ(i− qt).
Hence, we have h∗ dti µ(dti) if ℓ > rt − qt (i.e., |µ(h∗)∩Dt| < qt) or dtj ∈ µ(h∗) for some j ≥ i (i.e.,
i ≤ maxdtj∈D′∩Dt j}).
Therefore, D∗ ∈ argmax{uh∗(D′′) | D′′ ∈ Iˆ|cl(D′)} is an α-blocking pair for µ by D∗ ∈ Ih∗ ,
h∗ d µ(d) (∀d ∈ D∗), and uh∗(D∗) > α · uh∗(µ(h∗)), which contradicts the α-stability of µ.
Theorem 8 gives us a general lower bound in (1) and it enable us to derive two novel lower
bounds for k-matroid intersection and ρ-dimensional knapsack constraints.
Theorem 9. For any integer k ≥ 2 and any real (1 ≤) α < k, there exists no α-stable algorithm
for the (Uadd,Γ(k)mat)-markets.
Proof. Let D = D1∪D2 with D1 := {d11, . . . , d1k} and D2 := {d21, . . . , d2k}. In addition, let q1 = q2 =
1, I := 2D1 ∪ 2D2 (∈ Γ(k)mat), and u(D′) = |D′| for D′ ⊆ D.
For set A in Theorem 8, we have I ∩ A = {∅} ∪ {d1i | i ∈ [k]} ∪ {d2i | i ∈ [k]}. Thus, for any
D′ ∈ I ∩A, we have u(D′) = |D′| ≤ 1 and max{u(D′′) | D′′ ∈ I|cl(D′)} = k. Hence, by Theorem 8,
there exists a (Uadd,Γ(k)mat)-market without α-stable matchings.
Theorem 10. For any positive integer ρ and any positive real ǫ < 1/2, there exists no ρ2ǫ -stable
algorithm for the (Uadd,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-markets.
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Proof. Let r := ⌈1/ǫ⌉ − 1. We remark that ǫ < 1/r < 2ǫ. In addition, let m be an integer such
that (rρ)1−1/m > ρ2ǫ . Consider a (Uadd,Γ
(ρ,ǫ)
knap)-packing problem with mrρ+1 doctors D = D1 ∪D2
where D1 = {d0} and D2 = {d1 . . . , dmrρ}. We define q1 = q2 = 1.
Let us partition D2 into Da,b := {dt+r(a−1)+rρ(b−1) | t ∈ [r]} (a ∈ [ρ] and b ∈ [m]). Let u be an
additive utility function such that u(d0) = rρ and u(di) = (rρ)
b/m for di ∈ Da,b with a ∈ [ρ] and
b ∈ [m]. The weights for dimension ℓ ∈ [ρ] are defined as:
• w(d0, ℓ) = 1− ǫ,
• w(di, ℓ) = 1/r (b ∈ [m]; di ∈ Dℓ,b), and
• w(di, ℓ) = 0 (a ∈ [ρ] \ {ℓ}; b ∈ [m]; di ∈ Da,b).
For set A in Theorem 8, we have I ∩A = {D′ ⊆ D | |D′| ≤ 1}. We show that (1) holds for any
D′ ∈ I ∩ A. If D′ = ∅, we have ρ2ǫ · u(D′) = 0 < rρ = max{u(D′′) | D′′ ∈ I|cl(D′)}. Hence, we can
assume that D′ = {di}. If i = 0, we have
max{u(D′′) | D′′ ∈ I|cl(D′)}
u(D′)
=
u(D1,m ∪ · · · ∪Dρ,m)
u({d0}) =
r · ρ · rρ
rρ
= rρ >
ρ
2ǫ
.
If 1 ≤ i ≤ rρ (i.e., di ∈ Da,1 for some a ∈ [ρ]), we have
max{u(D′′) | D′′ ∈ I|cl(D′)}
u(D′)
≥ u({d0})
u({di}) =
rρ
(rρ)
1
m
>
ρ
2ǫ
.
Finally, if rρ < i ≤ mrρ, let q∗ := ⌈i∗/(rρ)⌉ (i.e., di ∈ Da,q∗ for some a ∈ [ρ]), and then we have
max{u(D′′) | D′′ ∈ I|cl(D′)}
u(D′)
≥ u(D
1,q∗−1 ∪ · · · ∪Dρ,q∗−1)
u({di})
≥ r · ρ · (rρ)
(q∗−1)/m
(rρ)q
∗/m
= (rρ)1−1/m >
ρ
2ǫ
.
Thus, by Theorem 8, there exists a (Uadd,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-market without ρ2ǫ -stable matchings.
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A Proof of Nonexistence of Stable Matchings
In this section, we formally prove that there exist no stable matchings in the markets described in
Examples 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. The market described in Example 1 has no α-stable matching for any 1 ≤ α < 2.
Proof. Recall that we consider the following market. There are four doctors D := {d1, d2, d3, d4}
and two hospitals H := {h1, h2}. The preferences of the doctors are h1 ≻di h2 ≻di ∅ for i = 1, 2 and
h2 ≻di h1 ≻di ∅ for i = 3, 4. Suppose that each hospital has a cardinality utility. The feasibility
families are Ih1 := 2{d1,d3} ∪ 2{d2,d4} and Ih2 := 2{d1,d4} ∪ 2{d2,d3}.
We prove by contradiction that, for 1 ≤ α < 2, no α-stable matching exists in this market.
Suppose that µ is an α-stable matching.
Case 1: |µ(h1)| = 0. Here {d1} is an α-blocking coalition for h1.
Case 2: |µ(h1)| = 2. |µ(h2)| ≤ 1. Thus, {d2, d3} and {d1, d4} are α-blocking coalitions for a case
when µ(h1) = {d1, d3} and µ(h1) = {d2, d4}, respectively.
Case 3: |µ(h1)| = 1. If µ(h1) = {d1}, then (d3, h2) ∈ µ since otherwise {d1, d3} is an α-blocking
coalition for h1. Thus, (d4, h2) 6∈ µ and hence {d2, d4} is an α-blocking coalition for h1. Similarly, µ
cannot be α-stable when µ(h1) = {d2}. In addition, {d1, d3} and {d2, d4} are α-blocking coalitions
for h1 when µ(h1) = {d3} and µ(h1) = {d4}, respectively.
Therefore, for 1 ≤ α < 2, no α-stable matching exists in this market.
Proposition 2. The market described in Example 2 has no 1.28-stable matching.
Proof. Recall that we consider the following market. There are four doctors D := {d1, d2, d3, d4}
and two hospitals H := {h1, h2}. The preferences of the doctors are h1 ≻di ∅ ≻di h2 for i = 1, 2,
h2 ≻d3 h1 ≻d3 ∅, and h1 ≻d4 h2 ≻d4 ∅. Suppose the Ih1 and Ih2 are capacity constraints of rank 2
and rank 1, respectively. Let uh1 be a submodular utility such that
uh1(D
′) :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
di∈D′
Ai
∣∣∣∣∣∣
whereA1 = {a1,1, a1,2, a1,3}, A2 = {a2,1, a2,2, a2,3}, A3 = {a3,1, a3,2, a3,3}, and A4 = {a1,1, a1,2, a2,1, a2,2}.
In addition, let uh2 be an additive utility such that uh2(d3) = 1 and uh2(d4) = 2.
We prove, by contradiction, that there exists no 1.28-stable matching in this market (where
1.28 < (1 +
√
17)/4). Suppose that µ is a 1.28-stable matching.
Case 1: (d4, h1) ∈ µ(h1). In this case, µ(h2) = {d3} since otherwise {d3} is a 1.28-blocking
coalition for h2. Thus, µ(h1) is {d4}, {d1, d4}, or {d2, d4}. Hence, uh1(µ(h1)) ≤ 7 +
√
17 and
{d1, d2} is a 1.28-blocking coalition for h1 by uh1({d1, d2}) = 6 + 2
√
17 = (7 +
√
17)(1 +
√
17)/4.
Case 2: (d4, h1) 6∈ µ(h1). In this case, uh1(µ(h1)) ≤ 6+2
√
17 and hence {d3, d4} is a 1.28-blocking
coalition for h1 by uh1({d3, d4}) = 10 + 2
√
17 = (6 + 2
√
17)(1 +
√
17)/4.
B Proofs of ΣP2 -hardness
Theorem 3. It is ΣP2 -hard to decide whether a given (Ucard,Γ(3)mat)-market has a 1-stable matching.
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Proof. We give a reduction from ∃∀3DM. Suppose that disjoint sets S∃, S∀ ⊆ X1 × X2 × X3 are
given as an instance of ∃∀3DM. Without loss of generality, we may assume that S∃ does not contain
conflicting elements (i.e., |{x1, x2, x3} ∩ {x′1, x′2, x′3}| = 0 for any distinct (x1, x2, x3), (x′1, x′2, x′3) ∈
S∃) since otherwise we can easily certificate that the instance is a yes-instance.
We construct a (Ucard,Γ(3)mat)-market that has a 1-stable matching if and only if the given in-
stance is a yes-instance. Consider a market (D,H,≻D, uH ,IH) with D := {d1, d2, d3, d4, d∗} ∪
{de}e∈S∃∪S∀ ∪ {d¯e}e∈S∃ and H := {h∗, h1, h2} ∪ {he}e∈S∃ . The doctors’ preference over the accept-
able hospitals are given as:
• de : he, h∗ (e ∈ S∃),
• d¯e : he (e ∈ S∃),
• de : h∗ (e ∈ S∀),
• d∗ : h∗,
• d1 : h∗, h1, h2,
• d2 : h1, h2,
• d3 : h2, h1,
• d4 : h2, h1.
The feasibility constraints are Ihe := Γ(1)cap (e ∈ S∃), Ih1 := 2{d1,d3} ∪ 2{d2,d4}, Ih2 := 2{d1,d4} ∪
2{d2,d3}, and Ih∗ := I(1) ∩ I(2) ∩ I(3) where
I(1) :=
{
T ⊆ D′
∣∣∣ x1 6= y1 (∀dx,dy∈T\{d1,d∗}such that x 6=y )} ,
I(2) :=
{
T ⊆ D′
∣∣∣∣∣ x2 6= y2 (
∀dx,dy∈T\{d1,d∗}
such that x 6=y )
|T \ {d∗}| ≤ |X1|
}
,
I(3) :=
{
T ⊆ D′
∣∣∣∣∣ x3 6= y3 (
∀dx,dy∈T\{d1,d∗}
such that x 6=y )
|T ∩ {d1, d∗}| ≤ 1
}
with D′ := {d1, d∗}∪ {de}e∈S∃∪S∀ . Note that each constraint can be represented by an intersection
of at most three matroids. Moreover, suppose that the utility of each hospital is cardinality.
Consider the case when the instance is a yes-instance. We show that there exists a 1-stable
matching in this case. Let Tˆ ∃ ⊆ S∃ be a certificate of the instance, i.e., |Tˆ ∃ ∪ T ∀| < |X1| for all
T ∀ ⊆ S∀ such that Tˆ ∃ ∪ T ∀ is a matching. Let Tˆ ∀ ∈ argmax{|T ∀| | Tˆ ∃ ∪ T ∀ ∈ Ih∗, T ∀ ⊆ S∀}.
Then, the matching
µ∗ ={(de, h∗)}e∈Tˆ∃∪Tˆ∀ ∪ {(d¯e, he)}e∈Tˆ∃ ∪ {(de, he)}e∈S∃\Tˆ∃ ∪ {(d1, h∗), (d2, h1), (d3, h2), (d4, h1)}
is 1-stable.
Conversely, consider the case when the instance is a no-instance. We show that there exists no
1-stable matching in this case. Suppose to the contrary that µ is a 1-stable matching. Then, µ
must contain (d1, h
∗) since the submarket induced by {d1, d2, d3, d4} and {h1, h2} is equivalent to
Example 1. Let T˜ ∃ := {e ∈ S∃ | de ∈ µ(h∗)} and T˜ ∀ ⊆ S∀ such that T˜ ∃ ∪ T ∀ is a matching and
|T˜ ∃∪ T˜ ∀| = |X1| (such a T˜ ∀ exists since the instance is a no-instance). Then {de}e∈T˜∃∪T˜∀ ∪{d∗} (∈
Ih∗) is a 1-blocking coalition for h∗ because |{de}e∈T˜∃∪T˜∀ ∪{d∗}| = |X1|+1 and |µ(h∗)| ≤ |X1|.
Theorem 4. For any nonnegative real ǫ < 1/2, it is ΣP2 -hard to decide whether a given (Ucard,Γ(2,ǫ)knap)-
market has a 1-stable matching.
Proof. We give a reduction from ∃∀SubsetSum. Suppose that disjoint sets S∃, S∀ ⊆ X1×X2×X3,
weights a, and an integer q are given as an instance of ∃∀SubsetSum. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that
∑
e∈S∃ a(e) < q <
∑
e∈S∃∪S∀ a(e) and |S∀| ≥ 3
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We construct a (Usub,Γcap)-market that has a 1-stable matching if and only if the given
instance is a yes-instance. Let M :=
∑
e∈S∃∪S∀ a(e) and n := |S∃ ∪ S∀|. Consider a mar-
ket (D,H,≻D, uH ,IH) with D := {d1, d2, d3, d4} ∪ {d∗1, . . . , d∗n} ∪ {de}e∈S∃∪S∀ ∪ {d¯e}e∈S∃ and
H := {h∗, h1, h2} ∪ {he}e∈S∃ . The doctors’ preference over the acceptable hospitals are given
as:
• de : he, h∗ (e ∈ S∃),
• d¯e : he (e ∈ S∃),
• de : h∗ (e ∈ S∀),
• d∗i : h∗ (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}),
• d1 : h∗, h1, h2,
• d2 : h1, h2,
• d3 : h2, h1,
• d4 : h2, h1.
The feasibility constraints are Ihe := Γ(1)cap (e ∈ S∃), Ih1 := 2{d1,d3} ∪ 2{d2,d4}, Ih2 := 2{d1,d4} ∪
2{d2,d3}, and Ih∗ ∈ Γ(2,ǫ)knap that can be represented by the following weights:
• w(de, 1) = (M + a(e))/(Mn + q), w(de, 2) = (M − a(e))/(Mn − q) (e ∈ S∃ ∪ S∀),
• w(d∗i , 1) =M/(Mn + q), w(de, 2) =M/(Mn − q) (i ∈ {1, . . . , n})
• w(d1, 1) = 2M/(Mn + q), w(d1, 2) = 0.
Moreover, suppose that the utility of each hospital is cardinality.
Consider the case when the instance is a yes-instance. We show that there exists a 1-stable
matching in this case. Let Tˆ ∃ ⊆ S∃ be a certificate of the instance, i.e., ∑e∈Tˆ∃∪T∀ a(e) 6= q for all
T ∀ ⊆ S∀. Then, the matching
µ∗ ={(de, h∗)}e∈Tˆ∃ ∪ {(d∗1, h∗), . . . , (d∗n−|Tˆ∃|−2, h∗)}
∪ {(d¯e, he)}e∈Tˆ∃ ∪ {(de, he)}e∈S∃\Tˆ∃ ∪ {(d1, h∗), (d2, h1), (d3, h2), (d4, h1)}
is 1-stable.
Conversely, consider the case when the instance is a no-instance. We show that there exists no
1-stable matching in this case. Suppose to the contrary that µ is a 1-stable matching. Then, µ
must contain (d1, h
∗) since the submarket induced by {d1, d2, d3, d4} and {h1, h2} is equivalent to
Example 1. Let T˜ ∃ = µ(h∗) ∩ S∃ and T˜ ∀ ⊆ S∀ such that ∑e∈Tˆ∃∪T∀ a(e) = q. (such a T˜ ∀ exists
since the instance is a no-instance). Then, T˜ ∃ ∪ T˜ ∀ ∪ {d∗1, . . . , dn−|T˜∃∪T˜∀|} (∈ Ih∗) is a 1-blocking
coalition for h∗ because |T˜ ∃ ∪ T˜ ∀ ∪ {d∗1, . . . , dn−|T˜∃∪T˜∀|}| = n and |µ(h∗)| ≤ n− 1.
C Competitive Ratio of Algorithm 3
Theorem 7. Algorithm 3 is ρ-competitive for the online (Ucard,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-packing problem and ρ/ǫ-
competitive for the online (Uadd,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-packing problem.
Proof. Consider an instance of the online (Uadd,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-packing problem (D,u,I) withD = {d1, . . . , dn}
and I = {D′ ⊆ D |∑d∈D′ w(d, j) ≤ 1 (j ∈ [ρ])}. We write w(d) for the value of maxj∈[ρ]w(d, j).
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Let σ be an order onD and i ∈ [n]. We argue that ρ·u(Alg(σ, i)) ≥ u(OPT(σ, i)) when the utility
is cardinal and (ρ/ǫ) ·u(Alg(σ, i)) ≥ u(OPT(σ, i)) when the utility is additive. If∑it=1 w(σ(t)) ≤ 1,
then we have u(Alg(σ, i)) = u(OPT(σ, i)) by Alg(σ, i) = {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}. Thus, we assume that∑i
t=1 w(σ(t)) > 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)} = {d1, . . . , di} and
u(d1)
w(d1)
≥ u(d2)
w(d2)
≥ · · · ≥ u(di)
w(di)
.
Let ℓ be the largest index such that
∑ℓ
t=1 w(dt) ≤ 1. Note that ℓ < i and
∑ℓ+1
t=1 w(dt) > 1. Then,
by a simple induction, we can see that {d1, . . . , dℓ} ⊆ Alg(σ, i).
For the cardinality case, we have u(Alg(σ, i)) = |Alg(σ, i)| = ℓ. Note that w(d1) ≤ w(d2) ≤
· · · ≤ w(dn) in this case. We claim that u(OPT(σ, i)) ≤ ρ · ℓ by contradiction. Suppose that
u(OPT(σ, i)) ≥ ρ · ℓ + 1 (i.e., |OPT(σ, i)| ≥ ρ · ℓ + 1). Then, by the pigeonhole principle, |{d ∈
OPT(σ, i) | w(d) = w(d, j)}| ≥ ℓ+ 1 for some j∗ ∈ [ρ]. For such a j∗, we have
∑
d∈OPT(σ,i)
w(d, j∗) ≥
ℓ+1∑
t=1
w(dt) > 1,
which contradicts the feasibility of OPT(σ, i). Hence, Algorithm 3 is ρ-competitive for the online
(Ucard,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-packing problem.
Moreover, for the additive case, u(Alg(σ, i)) is at least
ℓ∑
t=1
u(dt) ≥
∑ℓ
t=1 w(dt)∑ℓ+1
t=1 w(dt)
(
ℓ+1∑
t=1
u(dt)
)
=
(
1− w(dℓ+1)∑ℓ+1
t=1 w(dσ(t))
)(
ℓ+1∑
t=1
u(dσ(t))
)
≥ ǫ
(
ℓ+1∑
t=1
u(dσ(t))
)
≥ ǫ ·max
{
u(D′) | w(D
′) ≤ 1,
D′ ⊆ {d1, . . . , di}
}
≥ ǫ
ρ
·max
{
u(D′) |
∑
d∈D′ w(d) ≤ ρ,
D′ ⊆ {d1, . . . , di}
}
≥ ǫ
ρ
·max
{
u(D′) |
∑
d∈D′ w(d, j) ≤ 1 (∀j ∈ [ρ]),
D′ ⊆ {d1, . . . , di}
}
.
Here, the first inequality holds since
∑ℓ
t=1 u(dt)∑ℓ
t=1 w(dt)
is monotone nonincreasing for ℓ and the second
inequality holds by
∑ℓ+1
t=1 w(dt) > 1 and w(dℓ+1) ≤ (1− ǫ). Thus, Algorithm 3 is ρǫ -competitive for
the online (Uadd,Γ(ρ,ǫ)knap)-packing problem.
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